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Can Modi make the elephant dance?
morrow and his proven track record of high economic 
growth in his home state of Gujarat hit a home run in 
the 2014 election and delivered him a simple majority, 
the fi rst time this happened in India in 30 years.
All over the world, only a tiny share of the proposals 
included in election manifestos make it to parliament 
and become implemented, and this government is no 
diff erent. The more interesting aspect is the departure 
in Modi’s approach regarding development, consid-
ering his track record in Gujarat. The combination of 
robust infrastructure development and a (big) busi-
ness-friendly policy sets him apart from the typical 
left-of-center Indian politician who wants extensive 
state control of the economy in order to extract rents 
and disburse favors to his or her political base. 
As prime minister, Modi started off announcing a 
string of initiatives to make India an easy place to do 
business, build 100 smart cities, set up a high-speed 
railway network, etc. On the economic front, Modi 
India, 2013: The political stasis caused by a series of 
corruption scandals and an indecisive United Progres-
sive Alliance (UPA) government led by the Congress 
Party scuttled the economy, which had until 2010 ex-
perienced one of the highest growth rates for a major 
economy. The atmosphere of a weakened govern-
ment trudging into an election year shattered investor 
confi dence and the economic outlook. This situation, 
dubbed by observers “policy paralysis,” prepared 
a receptive ground for Narendra Modi’s campaign, 
which promised to cleanse the government of corrup-
tion and ineffi  ciency.  A communication-savvy Modi 
captured the imagination of both the lower and mid-
dle classes using slogans like “Acche din” (Good Days) 
and “Sabka saath, sabka vikaas” (With Everyone, De-
velopment for Everyone). His message of a better to-
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Figure 1: Ranking of Indian states in the world according to 2015 Human Development Report
has delivered on some of his major promises. Politi-
cally charged reforms are progressing, like the Goods 
and Service Tax Bill, which many observers thought 
would never see the light of day and which is now 
on its way to becoming a reality (although watered 
down in certain aspects). A new bankruptcy code, ac-
tive government support for start-ups and ambitious 
renewable energy targets for the power sector are 
some of the reforms which have brought cheers from 
the business community.
On the social reform front, the Modi government an-
nounced a departure from previous governments by 
making a fundamental shift from the concept of en-
titlement to empowerment. This was to be achieved 
by focusing on making the delivery of public services 
more effi  cient and giving the market a bigger role in 
providing some of these services. Among others, the 
Indian bureaucracy is infamous for two reasons: inef-
fi cient delivery (an estimated 54% of the wheat meant 
for the poor is diverted from the intended benefi cia-
ries) and suspicion of the markets / private sector. 
Modi’s audacious plan to reform and energize the so-
cial sector using the slogan “Minimum Government, 
Maximum Governance” was applauded even by his 
critics still reeling from the election defeat.
Of course, Modi has not replicated Gujarat at a na-
tional level, not only because of the federal nature of 
the country, but also because of the diversity of its 
states in their levels of social and economic develop-
ment. Though Gujarat is among the top states in India 
which attract domestic and international investment, 
it does not top the country in social indicators; in fact, 
in some indicators such as the under-fi ve mortality 
rate, or child mortality rate, it was the worst perform-
er in 2012 among the 11 states classifi ed as rich. Using 
the parameters of the United Nations’ Human Devel-
opment Index, Figure 1 ranks the states in India and 
compares them to other countries based on 2015 data. 
The hypothetical global ranking would vary between 
104 for Kerala and 163 for Bihar, with Gujarat com-
ing in at 139, close to the Indian national average of 
130. This goes to show that economic growth does not 
automatically lead to better social development in the 
Indian context.
Source: Mint on Dec. 17, 2015, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/3KhGMVXGxXcGYBRMsmDCFO/
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Figure 2: The Persistence of Cash in Consumer Transactions
Halfway into the Modi government’s tenure is a good 
time to see if its welfare policy is actually a departure 
from previous ones. To do this, let us analyze two ini-
tiatives, one which the government touts as one of its 
key achievements and another which it has grudg-
ingly carried forward from the previous government. 
The former is called JAM (Jan Dhan Aadhar Mobile), 
a new, technology-driven, market-oriented fi nan-
cial inclusion program to empower the poor; the latter 
is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Generation Act (MGNREGA), a 10-year-old legacy 
welfare program of the UPA government which has 
job entitlement at its core. 
JAM, the fi nancial inclusion program
Narendra Modi is one of the few political leaders in 
Asia who have an affi  nity for technology, demon-
strated not least by his active presence on Twitter and 
other social media. This has found its way into some 
of his initiatives, especially in the fi eld of fi nancial 
inclusion. According to the 2011 census, 557 million 
individuals in India are not part of the banking net-
work – the largest unbanked population in the world. 
The majority of these live in rural areas, due to higher 
default on credits, high transaction costs and the ab-
sence of collateral for loans. There has been a spate 
of initiatives, such as mobile ATMs) and post-offi  ce 
accounts, designed to remedy this situation, but suc-
cess has been limited. India still remains a cash-heavy 
economy, with almost 13% of GDP accounted for in 
cash compared to 4% in Brazil, according to The Eco-
nomic Times. As seen in Figure 2, the percentage of 
consumer transactions in cash is even higher, at 98%, 
the second highest in the world after Indonesia. The 
Reserve Bank of India spends more than €3 billion 
annually just to maintain its currency operations.
To increase banking coverage to the rural popula-
tion and to reduce the cash component of GDP, the 
Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) campaign 
was launched by Modi in his fi rst Independence Day 
speech (August 15, 2014), targeting individual un-
banked households in both urban and rural India. It 
encourages individuals to open no-frills and free sav-
ings accounts. In conjunction with the campaign, the 
JAM (Jan Dhan Aadhar Mobile) initiative combines the 
opening of millions of new bank accounts (Jan Dhan) 
with banking services that make use of a unique bio-
metric identity (Aadhar) and mobile-based banking 
solutions in order to eff ectively deliver government 
services and disburse subsidies.
The Jan Dhan program also gives account holders 
extra benefi ts, such as life insurance coverage worth 
Rs.30,000, accident insurance worth Rs.1,00,000 and 
a debit card, and it allows them to overdraw up to 
 Source: Disrupting Cash, Accelerating Electronic payments in India, Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2016
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Rs. 5,000. Some two years after the program was 
launched, more than 250 million bank accounts had 
been opened, collecting deposits of more than Rs. 740 
billion (more than €11 billion), as seen in Figure 3. 
The government has combined this with a social se-
curity system of insurances. Every year, more than 
39 million Indians fall back into poverty due to 
health-related expenses. Only 20% of Indians have 
some form of insurance and not more than 11% are 
covered by pensions. Introduced in combination with 
the Jan Dhan accounts by the government, the insur-
ance and pension programs saw enrollments of 30 
million and 3.4 million, respectively. Critics point out 
that opening bank accounts does not equal fi nancial 
inclusion and that the program, completed in mis-
sion mode, focuses on increasing enrollment without 
putting the necessary banking infrastructure in place. 
India has only 18 ATMs per 100,000 adults, com-
pared to a global average of 43. Sketchy digital con-
nectivity in rural hinterlands makes the expansion 
of the banking network to these areas expensive and 
time-consuming. All of this means that users liv-
ing in remote villages will have to travel to a nearby 
town to access an ATM, foregoing their daily wages. 
If the ATM does not work due to poor data connec-
tivity, a repeated loss of wages is guaranteed. This 
can be seen in the almost 60 million accounts (24% 
of all accounts) without any balance. Financial in-
clusion is being tackled seriously by the government, 
which has some legitimately good numbers to show, 
but it still has a fair distance to cover.
Aadhar, the biometric identifi cation card which the 
previous UPA government launched in 2009, is a cor-
nerstone of the Modi government’s welfare policy. 
The cloud-based system developed under the leader-
ship of Nandan Nilekani (co-founder of Infosys, one 
of the largest IT companies in India) aimed to revolu-
tionize identifi cation of every Indian through fi nger-
print and iris scans, thereby reducing the diversion of 
subsidies and welfare benefi ts. Though the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) opposed the Aadhar project when in 
opposition, claiming data privacy concerns, it made 
a U-turn after coming to power and made participa-
tion mandatory in order to receive various welfare 
pay-outs. Almost a billion Indians (93% of the pop-
ulation) currently have an Aadhar card and about $40 
billion in welfare payments are paid out through this 
identifi cation system. More than 70% of the Jan Dhan 
accounts are linked to the Aadhar system, thereby en-
suring that the neediest have their rightful benefi t put 
directly into their account without having to pay a cut 
to bureaucrats.
The Aadhar verifi cation system is now open to private 
industry as well. This is of signifi cant importance to 
the fi nancial sector as banks and other fi nancial ser-
vice providers in India, spend about €22 each time 
they must verify new client data thereby limiting their 
Figure 3: Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana – Accounts Opened as of January 8, 2016
Bank accounts No. of debit cards 209
Rural Cards linked to Aadhar ID161 152
Urban Total amount deposited (million euros)104 9,757
265 24.61%Total Percentage of accounts with no balance
 Source: http://pmjdy.gov.in/account 
All fi gures in millions
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reach to the middle classes. With Aadhar, the cost 
drops to €0.15, thereby accessing the bottom of the 
pyramid of more than half a billion Indians. It has 
been used more than three billion times since 2010 
and is promising to be a game-changer in mar-
ket-driven fi nancial inclusion. This combination of 
state-led modernization and opening the benefi ts of 
digital infrastructure to private enterprise fi ts in with 
Modi’s stated policy of citizen empowerment com-
bined with market access. 
What many did not see coming was his decision on 
November 8, 2016, to withdraw the legal tender of the 
500- and 1,000-rupee notes, announced live on televi-
sion. These two denominations constitute 86% of the 
Indian currency in circulation, and withdrawing the 
legal tender when the Indian economy was growing at 
above 7.5% (overtaking China for the fi rst time in de-
cades) was akin to swapping the fuel tanks of an aircraft 
which was cruising at supersonic speed. The aim was 
to deliver a “surgical strike” on unaccounted wealth, 
around 6% of which is estimated to be held in cash, as 
most is stored in gold, real estate and foreign currency. 
Since the announcement, the Jan Dhan accounts 
meant for the poor have seen an infl ow of more than 
€4 billion, pointing to the use of these accounts to 
launder black money. The fl urry of new regulations, 
the modifi cation of the new regulations and even the 
rescinding of some of them by the Reserve Bank of 
India, added to the woes of wrongly calibrated ATMs, 
suggest the botchy execution of an ill-devised plan 
in the name of a lofty ideal. After queuing for days in 
front of banks to exchange cash in old denominations, 
the Indian public put up stoically with their everyday 
lives being disrupted and exchanged more than 80% 
of the outstanding cash as of November 8. Unoffi  cial 
fi gures estimate the returned cash at 97% by the end 
of December, puncturing claims of the enormity of 
the country’s unaccounted cash. Not all cash is unac-
counted wealth, as most small-scale enterprises run 
entirely on cash. The informal sector employs more 
than 90% of the Indian workforce, consisting of mi-
grant laborers, street vendors, etc., who depend solely 
on cash. Demonetization has disproportionately af-
fected them and their support might be waning as the 
economy and employment stutter. The World Bank 
has marked down its growth estimate to 7% from its 
previous estimate of 7.6%. With regional elections 
coming up in early 2017 in Uttar Pradesh (the most 
populous state in India, with 200 million inhabitants, 
and one of its poorest), the political gains of taking 
an anti-rich stand is signifi cant. The question is how 
much of the common people’s pain is off set by their 
schadenfreude at the rich, who seem to have lost some 
of their ill begotten wealth. 
MGNREGA & rural employment  
Now let us look at a welfare program that was the core 
of the rural welfare policy implemented by the UPA 
government, which the current National Democrat-
ic Alliance (NDA) government continues. The Mahat-
ma Gandhi National Rural Employment Generation Act 
(MGNREGA) is the world’s biggest public works pro-
gram. It was enacted in September 2005, guaranteeing 
100 days of employment in villages to any household 
willing to do manual work at minimum wage. Under this 
law, any adult residing in a village can demand work 
from the government and is entitled to get it within 15 
days. Anyone who does not is entitled to an unemploy-
ment allowance. A minimum of 60% of the allocated 
budget was to be spent on labor and the rest on materi-
al. In the last 10 years of its existence, the Act has gen-
erated 19.86 billion person-days of employment, paying 
out more than €51 billion and benefi tting 276 million 
workers, with more than half the jobs going to women 
and 41% of the employed being Dalits (members of the 
lower castes) and Adivasis (indigenous tribes). 
A study done by the National Council for Applied Eco-
nomic Research in  2015 showed that the Act helped 
reduce poverty by 32% between 2005 and 2012 and 
prevented almost 14 million people from falling into 
poverty. Overall, 45% of the rural assets created 
through the Act were for sanitation, followed by 13% 
for rural irrigation – these two being the most urgent 
needs of rural India. The Act has indirect benefi ts, 
such as increasing rural wages and reducing gender 
wage gaps, thereby enabling better access to nutrition, 
health and education. It also improved the bargaining 
power of laborers when dealing with land owners and 
bailed them out in times of crisis. This scheme has thus 
been a life saver for many and has reduced migration 
to the cities. 
Of course there have been signifi cant leakages and cor-
ruption, as is true of most major programs implement-
ed on a billion-plus scale in a vast country like India. 
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A Comptroller and Auditor General Report showed 
that between 2010 and 2012 only 20% of the total 
funds allocated under the program were released for 
the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which account 
for almost 40% of India’s poor. Only about 40% of 
the workers get paid within the promised 15-day pe-
riod. 
With its “job entitlement” approach, MGNREGA was 
anathema to the newly sworn-in Modi government. 
Modi, however, decided to continue it to remind In-
dians of a “living monument of failures” of the UPA 
government. The government made fundamental 
changes like limiting the program to economically 
backward districts and reducing the labor share of the 
budget from 60% to 51%, thereby letting contractors 
substitute more machinery for labor. The two con-
secutive years of drought in 2014 and 2015 and falling 
global commodity prices led to an agrarian crisis, with 
farmers in distress. The attempt to pass a land reform 
bill in parliament which would make it easier for cor-
porations to acquire undeveloped land for projects led 
the opposition to allege that the Modi government is a 
“suit boot ki sarkar” (a government for the suit-wear-
ing elites). To prop up the rural economy and to shed 
its elite corporate image, the government then made a 
U-turn on the program and began increasing the bud-
getary allocation for the job-welfare imitative to an 
all-time high of almost €6 billion (Figure 4). 
Bringing the technology and transparency initiatives 
into such a colossal social welfare program would go 
a long way in securing the livelihoods of the most vul-
nerable and invisible Indians: the landless rural poor.
Conclusion 
It is neither easy nor fair to evaluate the social policy 
of any government based on an analysis of just two of 
its welfare projects, and only halfway into its legis-
lative period. But the chosen two are representative 
of the “new” thinking which the Modi government 
promised to introduce, and they can help us review its 
direction and success.   
Elephants can dance, once they warm up: Modi cap-
tured the country’s imagination by promising de-
velopment. His market-oriented approach combined 
with a presidential style of functioning has acceler-
ated the decision-making process. This works very 
well for international investors and big business-
es, which prefer a clear line of decision-making to a 
messy coalition. Translating the decisions into reality 
is the hardest part in India, with its federal structure 
and slow bureaucracy. The welfare sector in India is 
much more complex than elsewhere, having a variety 
of actors all the way down to the village level who are 
given a say in how programs are implemented. The 
sector has a legacy of ineffi  cient governance, inherent 
corruption and discretionary power.
Reforming this system is like cleaning the Augean 
stables, meaning execution is more important than 
making a quick cabinet decision. Even with the right 
intentions, the highly empowered bureaucrats in Del-
hi rarely understand the day-to-day challenges of the 
majority of poor Indians living thousands of kilome-
ters away in hamlets with no basic connectivity. The 
speed at which Modi wants to transform India often 
Figure 4: MGNREGA Key Figures
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runs up against the limits of bureaucratic implemen-
tation and the sheer lack of physical and social infra-
structure. Creation of rural infrastructure in terms of 
banking, education, etc., is a prerequisite to acceler-
ated fi nancial reforms. Making radical changes, how-
ever good the intentions might be, would disrupt the 
lives of people who do not yet have a social safety net 
to fall back upon. Building infrastructure and human 
capital step by step takes a long time and does not 
make for good headlines, but they are what form the 
foundation for a sustainable economy and society. 
Wealth does not trickle down that easily in India: The 
country’s high GDP growth over the past two decades 
has not necessarily translated into jobs for the mass-
es. Despite the abundant labor force, economic growth 
in India is quite capital intensive and, in view of tech-
nical developments like Industry 4.0, manufacturing 
is going to be more technology than labor intensive. 
Big-ticket investments like smart cities and high-
speed trains would follow this pattern and cannot 
provide employment to the million people entering 
the labor market every month. As much as one may 
question making an unskilled laborer dig a canal with 
basic tools in a village as part of a government-sub-
sidized employment program, there aren’t many al-
ternatives which India can pursue without massive 
investments in the education, health and skilling of 
its population. Given its caste system, India’s social 
structure limits economic freedom, which is a pre-
requisite to the functioning of free markets. Following 
the recommendations of highly paid Ivy League-edu-
cated consultants to let the economy take care of itself 
would lead to destitution and social unrest. The BJP 
government has been politically astute in changing 
tracks and adapting to this reality. In his New Year’s 
address, Modi promised to implement social security 
programs that would, for example, fi nancially support 
pregnant women and off er interest rate subsidies for 
housing loans for the poor. India’s poor are dependent 
on handouts and will remain so in the short to medi-
um term before the economy can absorb them. 
Self-help is the best help: India has the largest num-
ber of uneducated and deprived people on the planet 
who are routinely exploited by both the private sector, 
which fl outs norms relating to safety and wages, and 
bureaucrats, who have discretionary power over them. 
The social security net which Modi is building through 
a combination of insurances and a seamless trans-
fer of benefi ts is a big step in the right direction and 
needs to be pursued further. Initiatives which remove 
the middle men and empower the recipients through 
bank accounts and digital services are commendable 
measures and, combined with a strong focus on edu-
cation and health initiatives, would go a long way in 
realizing the dream of “Sabka saath, sabka vikas”. 
Not all Indians are yogis: The promise of a better to-
morrow is a standard feature of any election man-
ifesto and the winner is usually the one who makes 
the most credible pitch. Modi’s post-election an-
nouncements raised the bar quite high. Though half-
way through his term most of the promises have yet 
to be realized, the 2016 Pew Research Center survey 
shows that 81% of Indians have a favorable view of 
Modi (compared to 87% in 2015). His government’s 
gains are temporary, stemming from fi nancial wind-
falls generated by historically low oil prices and cheap 
capital infl ows due to quantitative easing in Europe 
and low interest rates in the US. In fact, oil is becom-
ing more expensive and capital fl ows might switch 
direction after an interest rate hike in the US and the 
tapering of quantitative easing in the EU. The Modi 
government has only a narrow window of opportuni-
ty to build a strong base for socioeconomic develop-
ment through massive investments robustly executed 
in education, health and infrastructure. The hard sell 
of a prosperous India needs a strong foundation to 
rest on. If it is lacking, the house would be shaken by 
global economic storms, the turbulences of which are 
growing thanks to a slowing China and a belligerent 
Donald Trump.
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